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The record shows that democratic nation-building is among the most
ambitious and difficult of foreign policy undertakings for the United
States. Of the 16 over the past century, democracy was sustained in only
4 countries ten years after the departure of American forces. Two of
these followed total defeat and surrender (in World War II) and two were
in tiny countries (Grenada and Panama). The record also reveals that
unilateral nation-building by the United States has an even lower
success rate perhaps because unilateralism has led to the creation of
surrogate regimes and direct American administration during the interim
post-conflict period. The use of interim surrogate regimes has produced
a record of complete failure. No American-supported surrogate regime
made the transition to democracy and only one case of direct American
administration (in Japan) succeeded in ushering in democracy. To heed
the lessons of experience, the Bush administration should support a
multilateral reconstruction strategy centered on bolstering political
legitimacy and economic burden-sharing under the auspices of the United
Nations.
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The real test for the success of President George W. Bush's preemptive strike
against the regime of Saddam Hussein is whether or not he can rebuild Iraq after
the war. Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time-consuming as
reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies. Even the
combination of unsurpassed military power and abundant wealth does not guarantee
success, let alone quick results. Historically, nation-building attempts by
outside powers are notable mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their
triumphs.
Among great powers, the United States is perhaps the most active
nation-builder. Since the founding of the republic, the United States has used
its armed forces abroad on more than 200 occasions. To be sure, the majority of
American military interventions abroad consisted of major wars (as in the two
world wars), peace-keeping missions (as in Bosnia today), proxy wars (as in
Nicaragua and Angola in the 1980s), covert operations (such as the coup in Chile
in 1973), humanitarian interventions (as in the Balkans in the 1990s), rescue of
American citizens, defense of allies under attack (as in Korea in 1950), and
one-off retaliatory strikes (as the bombing raid against Libya in 1986). To
separate ordinary military interventions from nation-building efforts, we apply
three strict criteria. First, the practical effect, if not the declared goal, of
American intervention must be a regime change or the survival of a regime which
would otherwise collapse. Regime change or survivability is the core objective
of nation-building because an outside power, such as the United States, must
overthrow a hostile regime and/or maintain a friendly indigenous regime to
implement its plans. Without such indigenous regimes, nation-building by outside
powers is merely colonial rule by another name. It is worth noting that, at the
outset, the primary goal of the United States was, in most cases, strategic.
Washington decided to replace or support a regime in a foreign land to defend
its core security and economic interests, not to build democracy. Later,
America's own political ideals and the need to sustain domestic support for
nation-building made it imperative that the United States establish democratic
rule in target nations.
The deployment of large numbers of American ground troops is the second
indispensable element of nation-building. As the case of Guatemala in 1954
demonstrates, regime-change may occasionally be accomplished without the
deployment of American ground forces. But nation-building generally requires the
lengthy commitment of ground forces which are used to depose the regime targeted
by the United States or maintain a regime the United States it favors. In many
cases, American ground troops are needed not only to fight hostile forces in
target countries, but to perform essential administrative functions, such as
establishing law and order.
Finally, the use of American military and civilian personnel in the political
administration of the target countries is the quintessential feature of
nation-building. As a result of deep American involvement in the political
process of target countries, the United States exercises decisive influence in
the selection of political leaders to head the new regimes. Washington also
restructures the key political institutions of the target countries (such as
rewriting the constitution and other important laws) and participates in the
routine administrative activities (such as public finance and delivery of social
services) of target countries.
Based on these criteria, we characterize 16 of more than 200 American
military interventions since 1900, roughly 8 percent, as attempts at
nation-building through the promotion or imposition of democratic institutions
desired by American policy-makers. (See Table 1 on Page
3).
The American Record in Nation-Building
The most striking aspect of the American record in nation-building is its
mixed legacy in establishing democratic regimes. Table 1 (on page
3) shows the sobering
results. The United States had two unambiguous success stories, Japan and West
Germany, both defeated Axis powers in WWII. (Unconditional surrender by the old
regimes in these two cases appeared to have created a more favorable
psychological environment for the rebuilding efforts in
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